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Several European countries have suspended the inoculation of the AstraZeneca vaccine out of
suspicion of causing deep vein thrombosis. In this letter we report some Fermi estimates performed
using a stochastic model aimed at making a risk-benefit analysis of the interruption of the delivery
of the AstraZeneca vaccine in France and Italy. Our results clearly show that excess deaths due
to the interruption of the vaccination campaign injections largely overrun those due to thrombosis
even in worst case scenarios of frequency and gravity of the vaccine side effects.
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We analyze, in the framework of epidemiological modelling, the stop in the
deployment of the AstraZeneca vaccine due to some suspected side effects. In-
deed, few dozen suspicious cases of Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT) over 5 mil-
lions vaccinations have arisen in Europe and pushed several European countries
to suspend AstraZeneca injection. Using both an epidemiological Susceptible-
Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model and statistical analysis of publicly
available data, we estimate the excess deaths resulting from missing inocula-
tions of the vaccine and those potentially linked to DVT side effects in France
and Italy. We find that, despite the many simplifications and limitations in our
analysis, the excess deaths differ by at least an order of magnitude in the two
strategies, that the relative benefits are wider in situations where the repro-
duction number is larger, and they increase with the temporal duration of the
vaccine ban.
I. INTRODUCTION
As of March 2021, the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus [1] has caused more than 120
millions infections worldwide with a total death toll of more than 2 millions. Up to the end
of 2020, the only effective measures to contain the spread of the virus were based on social
distancing, wearing face masks and more/less stringent lockdown [2–4]. Later on, a massive
vaccination campaign kicked off in several countries thanks to the availability of a variety
of vaccines (e.g., AstraZeneca, Johnson&Johnson, Moderna, Pfizer/BionTech, Sputnik V).
Such vaccines differ substantially in terms of efficacy, legal status, availability, and logistics
needed for their delivery to patients. According to various estimates [5], vaccinations would
produce a reduction in infections, and eventually yield to ”herd immunity” when ≈ 70%
of the population gets fully vaccinated. When such a large fraction of the population be-
comes immune to the disease, its spread from person to person becomes very unlikely, and
the whole community becomes protected. By allowing for an earlier easing of non-medical
measures against the SARS-CoV-2 virus, vaccination is also expected to significantly reduce
the economical, social and psychological impacts of lockdown measures [6]. Those estimates
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assume that there is no break in the supply of vaccines or any other suspension in the
procedure due to side effects from vaccination. Unfortunately, on March 15th 2021 several
European countries suspended the use of AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine as a precaution in
order to investigate the death of a few dozens of patients developing blood clots - associated
with Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT) [7] - after such vaccine, despite no proof has been found
yet of causal link between vaccination and DVT [8]. Health personnel who inoculated the
vaccine to those who died as a result of DVT are being investigated in Italy for manslaugh-
ter [9]. The contingent situation with the widespread COVID-19 pandemic naturally raises
the question of whether a prolonged stop in vaccinations coming from adopting the precau-
tionary principle [10] could cause an excess mortality beyond that caused by hypothetical
side effects of the vaccines. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) is currently assessing
whether the vaccine can continue to be used despite possibly causing this very rare side ef-
fect. In this Letter, we aim at exploring this issue by computing future COVID-19 epidemic
scenarios by comparing i) the excess mortality caused by reducing the vaccinations using the
stochastic Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model [11], and ii) the estimates
of the possible casualties caused by side effects of a vaccine, namely those associated with
DVT. We remark that the additional, longer-term effect of the presence of higher infection
rates, e.g. the increased risk of virus mutations leading to possibly more malignant and/or
more infectious variants, is not included in our treatment. Our analysis focuses on France
and Italy, which have been among the countries that have been most severely impacted by
the COVID-19 pandemic [12]. An important remark follows. Our goal is not to provide an
exact estimate of both i) and ii) but rather to perform an order-of-magnitude comparison
between excess deaths resulting from different scenarios of vaccination policy. We proceed
in the spirit of complexity science, where simple models are useful for elucidating the main
mechanisms behind complex behaviour and provide useful inputs for the deployment of more
advanced modelling suites and data collection strategies [13–17]. In other words, we will
approach the problem by performing Fermi estimates [18] where the classical back-of-the-
envelope calculations are performed via the SEIR model, allowing to take into account the
uncertainties in both model parameters and data. In nuce, we perform a counterfactual
analysis based on a story-line approach, which has become a powerful investigation method
for assessing risks coming from extreme events [19]. While the quantitative consolidation of
our results clearly requires extensive data analysis and modelling, our findings show with
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a large confidence that excess deaths due to the interruption of the vaccination campaign
largely override those due to DVT even in the worst case scenarios of frequency and gravity
of the vaccine side effects. Fermi estimates can provide valuable inputs for an efficient and
pragmatic application of the precautionary principle able to reduce the negative impacts of
hazards of various nature, as done in economics [20].
II. METHODS
The model [21] with time-dependent control parameters can mimic the dependence on
additional/external factors such as variability in the detected cases, different physiological
response to the virus, release or reinforcement of distancing measures [11]. Our compartmen-
tal model [22] divides the population into four groups, namely Susceptible (S), Exposed (E),
Infected (I), and Recovered (R) individuals, according to the following evolution equations:
St+1 = St − λ (1− α)
ItSt
Nt
− λα (1− σ) ItSt
Nt
+ (1− σα)St (1)
Et+1 = Et + λ (1− α)
ItSt
Nt
+ λα (1− σ) ItSt
Nt
+ (1− ε)Et (2)
It+1 = It + εEt + (1− α− β)It (3)
Rt+1 = Rt + σαSt + βIt (4)
In the SEIR model above, the classical parameters are the recovery rate (β), the inverse
of the incubation period (ε), and the infection rate (λ). Here we have generalized the model
presented in Faranda and Alberti [11] by introducing two additional parameters able to
succinctly mimic the strategies of a vaccination campaign, namely the vaccination rate per
capita α and the vaccine efficacy σ, see Sun and Hsieh [23]. In order to consider uncertainties
in long-term extrapolations and time-dependent control parameters, a stochastic approach is
used through which the control parameters κ ∈ {α, β, ε, λ, σ} are described by an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process [24] with drift as follows:
dκ = −κ(t)dt+ κ0dt+ ςκdWt, (5)
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where κ0 ∈ {α0, β0, ε0, λ0, σ0}, dWt is the increment of a Wiener process. We remind that
the basic reproduction number [25] is written as R0 = β0/λ0. In Eqs. (1)-(5) we set dt = 1,
which is the highest time resolution available for official COVID-19–related counts and is
relatively small compared to the characteristic times associated with COVID-19 infection,
incubation, and recovery/death.
α0 β0 ε0 σ0 m0
0.0015 [see Ref. 26] 0.37 [see Ref. 11] 0.27 [see Ref. 27] 0.59 [see Ref. 28] 0.015 [see Ref. 29]
ςα ςβ ςε ςσ ςm
0.25 [see Ref. 26] 0.2 [see Ref. 21] 0.2 [see Ref. 26] 0.1 [see Ref. 28] 0.0
TABLE I. Model parameters used for our simulations with corresponding references.
Initialising parameters with their associated reference are shown in Table I. The mortality
rate m0 is also shown, set to 0.015 [29]. While β0 and ε0 and the associated ς are the same as
in [11], the values of σ0 and respective ς are derived from the range given for the AstraZeneca
vaccine phase 3 tests for the first dose [28], and α0 and ςα are given supposing that both
Italy and France keep vaccinating 105 individuals per day with a 20% daily fluctuation [26].
As in [11], we also set ςλ = 0.2, allowing for 20% daily fluctuations in the infection rate.
Note that here we restrict to Gaussian fluctuations: as shown in [11], allowing for log-normal
fluctuations of the parameters does not change the average results but slightly enhance their
dispersion. See Supplementary Material for the numerical code.
III. ESTIMATE OF THE EXCESS DEATHS DUE TO STOPPING ASTRAZENECA
VACCINE INOCULATION
Figure 1 reports the daily number of deaths m0×It as a function of time for Italy (a) and
France (b). Initial conditions are set for both countries to the values reported on March 15th
as follows: for Italy, we set N = 60 · 106 population, Et=1 = It=1 = 20 · 104 as the infected
and exposed populations, Rt=1 = 11 · 106 as the sum of 9 · 106 recovered estimated from
serologic tests and 2 · 106 immunized from 2 doses of either Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna or
AstraZeneca vaccines and R0 = 1.16. For France, we set N = 67 ·106, Et=1 = It=1 = 25 ·104,
Rt=1 = 13.2 · 106 as the sum of 11 · 106 recovered estimated from serologic tests and 2.2 · 106
immunized from vaccines and R0 = 1.02. For both France and Italy, we assume that the
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virus, after the second wave, has infected the 15% of the population. This estimates are
based on Pullano et al. [30] who reported a 7%± 3% total infections for France after the
first wave, assuming that the second wave had a similar magnitude for both countries. We
remark however, that our results are basically insensitive to oscillation of S(1) of order of
5 millions individuals (cfr. Supplementary Material Figure S1). Rather than integrating
the Fokker-Planck equation [31] corresponding to the system of equations given above, we
follow a Monte Carlo approach and we perform two sets of Nr = 1000 realizations (see
supplementary material Figure S2 for a justification of this value): stopping (red) and
continuing (blue) the vaccination campaign at the same rate. The model is integrated for
500 days, that is about the time it would take to vaccine the rest of the susceptible population
with AstraZeneca at the rate of 105 individuals per day.
FIG. 1. The number of daily deaths m× I(t) as a function of time (300 out of 500 days shown) for
Italy (a) and France (b) using the values of R0 = 1.16 (Italy) and R0 = 1.02 reported respectively
for the 15th of March countries. Solid lines show the ensemble average, dotted lines extend to one
standard deviation of the mean. Red and blue curves refer respectively to no vaccination and a
vaccination campaign whose efficacy is 59%.
First, we observe a monotonic decrease in the daily deaths for all scenarios considered
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from the initial date t = t0 corresponding to March 15, 2021. This is in agreement with
actual estimates that for Italy and France the so-called third wave should reach its peak
in the second half of March, 2021 [32]Moreover, we observe that the cumulative number
of deaths significantly (we take the width of the error bars as level of significance) reduces
if vaccinations are continued at 100000 doses per day with respect to the scenario where
vaccination is stopped. For Italy (France) completely halting the vaccination, at the actual
epidemic rate, the number of excess deaths from COVID19 would amount to 9 ± 3 · 103
(1.2 ± 0.4 · 103) excess deaths from COVID19. The difference between the two countries
is largely due to the value of R0, which is larger for Italy. This suggests that halting
vaccination in a growing epidemics phase (Italy) has more dramatic consequences than in a
more controlled scenario of R0 ≈ 1 (France).
Our previous analysis is based on a total stop of AstraZeneca vaccination. However,
a more realistic scenario is to assume that AstraZeneca vaccination will resume after a
limited number of days used for verification. We investigate this effect in Fig. 2. There,
we consider the average excess deaths as a function of the interruption length in number of
days (x-axis) and R0 (y-axis) for Italy (a) and France (b). The excess deaths are computed
with respect to a base scenario where vaccine injections are never interrupted and they
are averaged over 1000 realizations of the SEIR model. Figure 2 shows that the longer is
the vaccine injections disruption, the higher is the number of excess deaths. The impact
is stronger for higher values of R0. While waiting the advice of EMA about AstraZeneca
safety, many national health agencies also announced that, when allowed, they would resume
the vaccination at a higher rate than before to override the effects of the stop. In the
supplementary Figure S3 we therefore present a set of simulation where, for a number of
days equal to those of the vaccination interruption, injections are performed at a double
rate than originally planned, i.e., 2·105 individuals/day, in order to compensate for the lost
vaccinations. Although reduced, the number of excess deaths is still high and of the same
order of magnitude as the one estimated in Fig. 2, as a result of the nonlinear cascade effect
of the extra infections occurred in the period when vaccinations were interrupted. A focus
on the actual values of R0 for Italy and France is reported in Fig. 3. Here we compare the
two countries and we also show the effect of doubling vaccination rates. This shows that
excess deaths scale down by a factor two but they remain of the same order of magnitude
as for the case of a business-as-usual vaccination rate, namely 105 vaccinations/day.
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FIG. 2. (a,c) Average and (b,d) standard deviation over Nr = 1000 realizations of the stochastic
SEIR model showing the excess deaths m × I(t) as a function of the number of the days of
interruption of AstraZeneca vaccinations (x-axis) and R0 (y-axis) for Italy (a,b) and France (c,d).
The excess deaths are computed with respect to a base scenario where vaccine injections are never
interrupted. Note that x-axis starts at N = 1. Each realization of the SEIR model is integrated
for 500 days.
IV. WORST CASE SCENARIOS FOR ASTRAZENECA SIDE EFFECTS
The final step in our investigation is to compare the previous estimates of excess deaths
with an order of magnitude estimate of deaths due to DVT resulting from side effects
of the AstraZeneca vaccine. In order to make a meaningful comparison, in a case where
uncertainties are very large and hard to quantify, we will consider a worst case scenario for
the impacts of the side effects. This scenario relies on the unrealistic hypothesis that the
totality of susceptible population to DVT suffers from DVT shortly after being vaccinated,
and the lethality rate is similar to the one observed in the overall population.
As of March 15th 2021, few dozens suspect cases of DVT have been reported over a
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FIG. 3. Average over Nr = 1000 realizations of the stochastic SEIR model showing the excess
deaths m×I(t) as a function of the number of the days of interruption of AstraZeneca vaccinations
for Italy R0 = 1.16 (black and France R0 = 1.02 (magenta). Simulations are smoothed with a
moving average filter with window size 10 days. Stars indicate simulations where vaccination are
resumed at the same rate, dots simulations where the vaccination rate is doubled for a number of
days equivalent to those of interruption. Error bars are computed as the mean relative error.
number of 5 millions vaccinated people with AstraZeneca in Europe[33]. By suspect cases
we mean people who have developed DVT in the few days following the vaccination. This
leads us to an estimate of a frequency of 6 cases per million of vaccines. Let us call this
rate rDV TAZ . Let us also consider that, in the case of France, the incidence of DVT has been
estimated to 1800 people per 1 million inhabitants per year ([34]), with a lethality rate after
three months of 5% [35], raising to 30% when a period of 5 years is considered [7]. This
leads to estimating a total of the order of 10000 deaths per year as a result of DVT. Even
assuming that all DVT cases following the inoculation of the AstraZeneca vaccine would
have not manifested themselves in absence of the injection, we have that N vaccinations
would lead to an extra N × rDV TAZ DVT cases. Let us assume that all of these cases result
into death[36]. We then have that 105 daily vaccinations would result into a maximum of
0.6 daily deaths. In 500 days, which is the time needed to cover the entirety of the French
population, this leads to an upper bound of 300 deaths. Considering a death rate of 30%,
the number scales down to approximately 100, while considering a death rate of 5% the
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number scales down to approximately 15. Similar figures apply for Italy.
V. CONCLUSION
Decision-making in presence of strong uncertainties associated with health and environ-
mental risks is an extremely complex process, resulting from the interplay between science,
politics, stakeholders, activists, lobbies, media, and society at large [37–39]. In this letter,
we have aimed at contributing to the debate on different strategies for combating, in condi-
tions of great uncertainties in terms of health and social response, pandemic like the current
one caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. We have focused on the case of the AstraZeneca
COVID-19 vaccine and on the locales of Italy and France, for the period starting on March
15th 2021. The goal is providing a semi-quantitative comparison, based on Fermi estimates
informed by a simple yet robust stochastic model, between the excess deaths due to tempo-
ral restriction in the deployment of a still experimental vaccine and the excess deaths due
to its possible side effects. Given the many uncertainties on the (possible) side effects of
the vaccine, we have resorted to making worst case scenario calculations in order to pro-
vide a robust upper bound to the related excess deaths. Our results are preliminary and
should be supplemented by more detailed modelling and data collection exercises. Indeed:
i) we assume a single vaccine with the nominal AstraZeneca efficacy, neglecting the other
available vaccines, ii) we consider a fixed vaccination rate, iii) for AstraZeneca DVT side
effects we consider French data and rescale them for the Italian populations, iv) we focused
our analysis on DVT side effects, but other pathologies could be considered with the same
approach. Yet, these results clearly suggest - see a useful summary in Table II - that the
benefits of deploying the vaccine greatly outweigh the associated risks, and that the relative
benefits are wider in situations where the reproduction number is larger, and they increase
with the temporal duration of the vaccine ban. We have also analysed the case of resuming
the vaccinations at a double rate (2 · 105 vaccinations/day) for an amount of days equal to
vaccine interruption period (Fig. 3 and Fig. S3). This analysis has pointed out that excess
deaths are still of the same order of magnitude as those observed by resuming vaccinations
with 105 vaccinations/day injection rate but scale down by a factor 2. This is an evident
outcome of the nonlinear effects of epidemiological dynamics: those who have not been vac-
cinated can contaminate other individuals before vaccination resume, as a result of a cascade
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mechanism also observed in turbulent flows: there, energy injected in large scales vortex is
transferred to small scales via nonlinear interactions between scales [40]. Here, in analogy,
a few non-vaccinated individuals can produce a large number of infected individuals. The
process can only stop if a huge number of daily vaccinations (much larger than a factor
2) is performed. Nevertheless, this still requires a characteristic recovery timescale T that
is larger than the typical immunization scale η (e.g., a few months for AstraZeneca [28]).
Finally, even if several countries have resumed, or are going to resume, AstraZeneca vaccina-
tions, the effect of the interruption is hard to counterbalance and require vaccination efforts
difficult to set-up in due times. Furthermore, at least for large countries where AstraZeneca
vaccination could resume, the confidence of the population in the vaccines is reduced by a
non negligible percentage [41]. In this sense, our estimates are likely to be conservative and
might possibly underestimate the excess deaths deriving from the disbelief in the vaccina-
tion policies observed in the largest European countries. The analysis presented here has
been performed with a parsimonious but well-posed and tested model and we hope that the
results we obtain might be the starting point for more detailed, more advanced, and more
mature investigations with sophisticated models and data collection exercises.
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Excess Deaths Italy France
Stop AZ for t = 500 days 9000± 3000 1200± 400
Stop AZ for t = 14 days 1700± 500 430± 70
Stop AZ for t = 7 days 790± 90 160± 30
Stop AZ for t = 3 days 260± 50 130± 20
Worst case DVT deaths due to AZ ≈ 280 ≈ 300
High fatality DVT deaths due to AZ ≈ 90 ≈ 100
Standard fatality DVT deaths due to AZ ≈ 13 ≈ 15
TABLE II. The first 4 lines of the table indicate the excess deaths due to the interruption of
AstraZeneca compared to a reference scenario where the vaccine injections are never interrupted.
The SEIR model is integrated for 500 days with R0 = 1.16 for Italy and R0 = 1.02 for France.
The last 3 rows of the table show the deaths from deep vein thrombosis (DVT) that could be due
to the vaccine in three different scenarios: the worst case (100% mortality rate), a high mortality
scenario (death rate of 30%) and a standard mortality scenario (5% mortality rate) assuming a
period of 500 days.
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The supplemental Material for ”Interrupting vaccination policies can greatly spread SARS-CoV-
2 and enhance mortality from COVID-19 disease: the AstraZeneca case for France and Italy”




%Numerical SEIR code for "Interrupting vaccination policies can greatly spread
%SARS-CoV-2 and enhance mortality from COVID-19 disease: the AstraZeneca case
%for France and Italy" by Faranda et al.
%This code integrates the SEIR Model with vaccination policies interrupted for 7 days.





S(1)=N-9000000-2000000; %Susceptibles, including those
%who had the virus in the first and second wave (9 millions)





alpha0=100000./N ; %Vaccination rate
sigma0=0.59 ; % Vaccine Efficacy




R0=lambda0./beta0; %Basic Reproduction number
%Dynamical steps



























FIG. 1. (a,c) Average and (b,d) standard deviation over Nr = 1000 realizations of the SEIR
model showing the excess deaths m× I(t) as a function of the number of the days of interruption
of AstraZeneca vaccinations (x-axis) and R0 (y-axis) for Italy with R(1) = 7 millions (a,b) and
R(1) = 13 millions (c,d). The excess deaths are computed with respect to a base scenario where
vaccine injections are never interrupted. Arrows indicate the values of R0 chosen for Figs. 2 and
3. The model is integrated for 500 days. x-axis starts at N = 1
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FIG. 2. Convergence in number of realisation Nr (x-axis) of the average excess deaths (y-axis)
in Italy after a 5 days interruption of AstraZeneca vaccinations. The excess deaths are computed
with respect to a base scenario where vaccine injections are never interrupted. The average excess
deaths achieve a good convergence at 103 realizations.
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FIG. 3. (a,c) Average and (b,d) standard deviation over Nr = 1000 realizations of the stochastic
SEIR model showing the excess deaths m × I(t) as a function of the number of the days of
interruption of AstraZeneca vaccinations (x-axis) and R0 (y-axis) for Italy (a,b) and France (c,d).
The excess deaths are computed with respect to a base scenario where vaccine injections are never
interrupted. With respect to Figure 2 in the main text, here the vaccination rate is doubled for
a number of days equivalent to those of interruption. Note that x-axis starts at N = 1. Each
realization of the SEIR model is integrated for 500 days.
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